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Abstract 
Rud (1997) wrote in this journal: " Leaving aside the blatant (to my eyes
at least) problems of power and dominance of an elderly Greek citizen
teaching a slave boy, this example [the Meno] of teaching has always left
me cold." Garlikov (1998) addressed Rud's criticism of the Socratic
dialogue. The present article addresses and extends Garlikov's response
to cover general notions of power, and shows how these may affect
Socratic discourse. Socratic pedagogy is not merely an illusory exercise
where participants acquiesce to notions of truth because of power
differentials. But power relations play a role in all communicative
contexts. However, in Socractic pedagogy the adverse effects of power
are greatly reduced and the focus is shifted from people to propositions. 
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Introduction
The Meno has long been considered the paradigmatic example of the Socratic method.
Here, solely by asking questions, Socrates teaches a young slave boy that the area of a
large square is twice the area of a smaller one. Some scholars, however, find both the
Socratic method generally, and this example specifically, to be problematic because of
notions of power and the influence this may have on the participants' responses.
Garlikov engaged part of the criticism that relates to the idea of respondents being
logically led to given conclusions (Garlikov, 1998; Rud, 1997). However, the gap in the
literature that now needs to be addressed deals with the power differential between
participants and whether or not this could influence the interlocutor's responses in a
Socratic discourse. Is it possible that Rud's criticism (even though he offers it as just an
aside) of Socratic pedagogy is misguided, and assent to propositions are the consequence
of power dynamics rather than students being led to certain conclusions (Rud, 1997)?
This essay will focus on these ideas, specifically exploring the nature of power in
discourse as it relates to Socratic questioning, and show that while the criticisms
definitely have merit, they are not strong enough to undermine the Socratic project.
There are two ways that power relations could impact a Socratic discourse, one obvious
and one less obvious, if: 1) the participants respond in a certain way because they seek
something other than the truth, such as approval or a good grade, and 2) the race, class,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc., of either the Socratic practitioner or of her
interlocutors play a role in the discourse, i.e., if arguments and counterexamples offered
do not stand or fall on their own merit, but because of an intrinsic quality of the utterer.
Let us now examine these and see what role, if any, they play in the successful practice
of the Socratic pedagogy.
The relationship between knowledge and power in discourse has been extensively
examined (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1997; Boileau, 2000). Often these criticisms focus on
the more obvious abuses of power in discourse, such as individuals not being allowed
into the discourse, or individuals who go into a discourse with certain assumptions about
what someone can know based upon their sex or race.(Note 1) These are issues in any
discourse, and the first point, while admittedly important, is structural and somewhat
less interesting, and consequently will not be addressed here (i.e., in a classroom
environment issues of self-selection of participants, or who physically gets to be in the
classroom, is not immediately relevant to the ideas being examined here). The second
issue does indeed impact Socratic discourse, and surprisingly little to no research has
explained how power dynamics impact Socratic practitioners and their students
(Boghossian, 2001). If it is the case that truth seeking educational communities cannot
be established because of power disparities between students and teachers, then not just
Socratic pedagogy, but the genuineness and authenticity of all dialogical pedagogies are
called into question. If the problems posed by the Socratic teacher are met with
responses that have some other intent rather than to get at the truth, then Socratic
pedagogy cannot be said to be genuinely truth oriented because the participants did not
yield to propositions on the basis of reason.
Race, class and gender
One of the presuppositions of the method is that what is at issue is the force of argument,
not exogenous factors such as the race, gender or social class of the person who
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But what is more likely, that an argument will be subconsciously discounted because of
the race of the person who makes it, or that an argument, regardless of the race of the
person who makes it, succeeds or fails because of the elenetic process? That is, in
genuine Socratic practice arguments cannot be de facto rejected; they must be rejected
because of a counterexample or by sheer force of argument. (Of course anyone can
intentionally disregard statements by people of a certain race, and these more obvious
and even more egregious instances are not at issue here because this has nothing to do
with Socratic pedagogy and everything to do with blatant racism. What is at issue are
people's voices being heard and their claims being answered, or not, because of who they
are). Subconsciously or otherwise, of course the Socratic teacher could overlook, or give
less attention to, someone's claims because of their race. One could, for example,
disregard a devastating counterexample as irrelevant because they had the prejudice
going into the discourse that people who are a particular race, gender or sexual
orientation could never saying anything substantive. But this would not be Socratic; this
would be a form of abuse that masquerades as Socratic and as such could be found in
any pedagogical model. The claim here is that this is more and not less likely to be
exposed in Socratic pedagogy due to the ability of rational participants to assent to true
propositions; and this, in turn, is because of a rational process that removes much of the
ambiguity and confusion from adjudicating claims.
The elenchus does not necessarily bring one's racial and gender assumptions to the
surface, but it does force the participants to focus on the arguments and not the people
who make the arguments. If there is ever a dispute, the claim is at issue and not the
person. Because of this it is more likely that issues of race and gender will not play a role
in the discourse, as opposed to other models where there is no process for the
adjudication of claims. Therefore, while race and gender play a part in all dialogical
contexts, they play less of a role in a Socratic discourse. As such racial and gender issues
do not compromise the integrity of the Socratic method.
Power dynamics
The Socratic method centers on the notion that attaining the truth is possible through
discourse (Vlastos, 1994). The idea behind this is that through argument, example and
counterexample, rational participants will assent to true propositions. However, this is
bundled with a number of presuppositions, such as the presupposition that participants
enter into the discourse freely (as opposed to being forced to take a required class where
the teacher's pedagogical model is Socratic), and that responses are being given because
they are they are believed to be true (as opposed to being assented to because of
convenience or because respondents will “get something” from their interlocutor).(Note
3) If it is indeed the case respondents will receive some tangible benefit, or at least
perceive that they will, it stands to reason that they will provide answers that they
believe the Socratic practitioner wants to hear. If they provide responses for any reason
other than the belief that what they say is true, then the elenchus cannot achieve its
epistemological ambitions. If this is the case then it is not a trick of inference, or a
“twisting” of logic, but that the respondents want to give certain answers because of
something other than logic, like approbation or even fear of looking stupid.
An important question then becomes whether it is the case that because of one's position
as a teacher and the authority and power that come with that role, students in a Socratic
classroom environment will assent to certain propositions that they would not otherwise
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agree to if they were just with their peers? It is certainly possible, because of the
student/teacher power dynamic, students would too easily permit the teacher to influence
and even guide their responses. This has the obvious impact of subverting genuine
educational discourse because differences in power between and among those engaged
in conversation prohibit an honest exchange of ideas—and an honest exchange of ideas
rests at the heart of the elenchus. For the elenchus to work, students need to agree or
disagree with certain propositions because of their belief in their truth or falsity. So if it
is the case that a proposition is offered not because it is viewed as being true, but for
some other reason, then genuine discourse would seem to be inhibited. If students and
teachers cannot have an authentic truth-seeking classroom, or even have a genuine
discourse, then one of the principal goals of Socratic pedagogy—truth seeking—is
seriously compromised.
Thus successful Socratic pedagogy will disabuse participants of more rigid notions of
relations of power that are structurally embedded in traditional communicative contexts.
Traditional power relations, specifically in a classroom setting, center on both the
teacher's “power position” and her privileged access to the truth (Etzioni, 1975, p. 5).
But paradoxically Socratic pedagogy confuses, and to an extent even inverts, traditional
power relations. The Socratic practitioner is not claiming to have all the answers. She is,
in a very real sense, deriving power from the declarations of her interlocutors (if there
are no claims made the Socratic questioner has nothing to proceed from). When students
participate in a Socratic discourse it is not immediately clear where the lines of power
are. Truth is no longer the exclusive province of the teacher. Truth switches from people
to propositions. In traditional discourses perceptions of truth are at least partially
constructed by position, race, social and economic class, and even by aspects of
appearance, like age or disability status. This reorientation of the power dynamic can be
socially, intellectually, and even educationally disorienting.
Of course this does not negate the fact that participants in a Socratic classroom setting
will respond in certain ways not because of the truth but because of a perceived benefit
from a given response. It is not philosophical naïveté to claim that no matter what the
reason is for one's responses, perceptions of reward may make students more easily led
by the teacher, but it will not change either the truth of the matter or the defensibility of
their claim. Perhaps this is best seen with a specific example from Garlikov's article:
An example of the latter case was in a discussion of homosexuality in an
"Ethics and Society" course where many students said that homosexuality
was wrong because (the idea of) it was so disgusting. I asked them whether
they thought that such disgust was a sufficient characteristic to make an
action be immoral. They said it was. I asked them then to close their eyes
and think about ... their parents having sex with each other. They all let out
an even bigger groan of disgust, and said they found that idea really
disgusting. So I asked whether they would have to conclude then that it was
immoral for their parents ever to have (or to have had) sex with each other.
They agreed it was not. Of course they then asked whether that meant I
thought homosexuality was moral. My response was that whether it is or is
not is simply unrelated to whether it is personally disgusting or not to
anyone. I was not trying to argue in this particular case for or against the
morality of homosexuality, but was merely trying to get them to see that
finding an action disgusting did not justify their thinking it must be immoral
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just because of that (Garlikov, 1998).
In this outstanding example of the Socratic method, if students thought that their teacher
did not like homosexuality, then they could easily have lied and given false statements.
For example, anticipating where he was going, they could have responded that
envisioning their parents having sex was not disgusting, but that it made them
uncomfortable. This would still have left room for defending their claim that all things
that are disgusting are immoral. But then Garlikov could have made further inquiries
about other things that are disgusting, such as eating a plate of live insects, and shown
that disgust is neither necessary nor sufficient to judge a thing as immoral. In either
case, no matter what their responses were, through successful elenetic inquiry a truth of
the matter would have emerged. Their claims would have withstood the elenchus, or not.
The relationship between being disgusting and being immoral would have been
established, or not.
So the question then becomes, how much, if at all, a student's giving a response that she
think the teacher wants to hear is going to adversely affect the truth seeking conditions
of the dialectic?(Note 4) My claim is that if the elenchus is successfully applied, power
relations will still impact Socratic discourse, but not to such an extent as to make it an
ineffective pedagogy. Not only is truth seeking not compromised, but also other virtues
such as getting students to think critically and engage ideas remain unscathed. In our
present example, to even think so far ahead in a discourse as to be able to anticipate
where it is going requires a fairly high degree of cognitive ability.(Note 5) And if
students are not capable of this, then the issue that they would give a response because
of a teacher's sentiment, or because they want to “get something,” are dulled. The idea of
giving a response because of something presupposes that students know what that
response is that they are supposed to give. Not only is it often unclear what response the
teacher wants, but that does not guarantee that particular conclusions could be reached.
So then the issue becomes, what if students give responses not based upon the teacher's
sentiment, but because they think that is the smartest response to give, and giving the
smartest response means that they will get the best grade. (That is, the smartest response
may not be one that a student believes accords with the truth, but the one that makes
them look the most intelligent; so one's motivation would not be for the truth but to look
intelligent.) Well, this still would not adversely impact the discourse to such an extent
that its practice would be jeopardized. Giving the best response, or at least attempting to,
would relegate the truth seeking status of the method to secondary or even tertiary
significance, conveying primacy on the critical thinking aspect of the method.
Depending upon the teacher's desires, this could actually be beneficial.(Note 6) But this
would only adversely affect (perhaps more by slowing down the discourse by taking
more time to arrive at conclusions), and not endanger, the method's truth seeking
orientation.
Conclusion
Garlikov addressed the first part of Rud's criticism about Socratic dialogue being
leading. This work has addressed and extended his response to cover general notions of
power, and shown how these could impact a Socratic discourse. Because of the
proposition oriented nature of the elenchus, Socratic pedagogy is not merely an illusory
exercise where participants acquiesce to notions of truth due to power differentials. But
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power relations certainly do play a role in all communicative contexts, and Socratic
dialogue is no exception. What is an exception, however, is that the adverse effects of
power are minimized, and the focus is shifted from people to propositions.
Notes
1
 For example, in the Symposium Socrates asks the women and the slaves to leave the
room. Or more recently, feminist epistemology claims that the sex of the knower at least
partially determines what is known, what can be known, and how it becomes known.
2
 The best way, if at all, these could be controlled for would be through blindly graded
exams, probably utilizing a banking pedagogy where there are very specific right and
wrong answers that need to be memorized and regurgitated (Friere, 1970).
3
 Foucault would argue that one always gets something from being correct in every
discourse, not just restricted academic discourses. Perhaps due to the limited context, it
is more obvious what a student “gets” when he answers a question correctly. Where he
stands in the power web becomes more visible. He gets a special relationship to the
teacher. The teacher knows best and now he knows second best—and everyone knows
that he know second best.
4
 What often happens in the classroom is that a good Socratic teacher is able to prevent
students from correctly guessing what she wants to hear. This is because the Socratic
teacher is inquiring into the reasoning behind a position—she examining whether or not
it will stand up to scrutiny. Challenging a student's reasoning tends to make the student
think that his conclusion is being challenged. Students very quickly learn that it is
difficult to figure out the teacher's position, particularly when she challenges conclusions
that are contradictory to each other, one of which is supposedly what the teacher
believes. But if Socratic teachers are looking for sound arguments, and if the student is
able to come up with a good argument, reason (and therefore the best method we have to
search for truth by using evidence to make inferences and deductions) is served even if it
also pleases the teacher. But the enterprise is so difficult in most complex situations that
it is hard to imagine a student's coming up with a chain of reasoning that will withstand
the teacher's scrutiny just because that student is trying to impress her or get her to like
him by guessing. Guesses are not likely to do the job.
5
 In a personal correspondence Garlikov wrote, “even in the Socratic dialogues, as in
classrooms, interlocutors give wrong answers that they try to support, which shows, I
think, they are not just giving psychologically prompted answers, but answers that show
they really think about the material—logically and conceptually.”
6
 Though in my personal opinion, this would be a heartbreaking consequence of
privileging intellectual qualities over a search for and love of the truth.
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